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I. INTRODUCTION
President Trump, reiterating the position he took during his 2016
presidential campaign, 1 has recently reaffirmed his pledge to "get rid of
and totally destroy the Johnson Amendment," a provision of the

* This essay is based on Chapter 7 of the author's book, EDWARD A. ZELINSKY,
TAXING THE CHURCH: RELIGION, EXEMPTIONS, ENTANGLEMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION
187-206 (2017).
t Annie and Morris Trachman Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, Yeshiva University.
1. David Sherfinski, Donald Trump's Push to Repeal Johnson Amendment Buoys
Religious Freedom
Advocates,
WASH.
TIMES
(Aug.
14,
2016),
http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/14/donald-trumps•push-to-repeal-johnsonamendment-buonutm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=printfriendly
&utm_source=tool.
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Internal Revenue Code that prohibits tax-exempt institutions from
participating in political campaigns. 2 The Code also bars tax-exempt
institutions, including churches, from substantial lobbying activities. 3
Rather than the blanket repeal of the Johnson Amendment
proposed by President Trump, I argue for a statutory safe harbor for
churches' internal communications. This limited safe harbor would
protect in-house church discussions from both section 501(c)(3)'s ban on
substantial lobbying and from its prohibition on political campaigning.
Under this proposed amendment to the Internal Revenue Code,
churches, along with other religious and secular tax-exempt
institutions, would otherwise remain subject to the Code's bars on
campaigning and lobbying. While entanglement considerations counsel
greater protection than current law provides for speech within
churches, these statutory bars properly deter the diversion of income
tax-deductible resources to campaigning and lobbying. My more
targeted reform of the Johnson Amendment would achieve a better
balance by addressing the legitimate concerns of churches about their
First Amendment rights while preventing the tax-exempt sector from
becoming a conduit for tax-deductible campaign contributions.

II. SECTION 5Ol(C)(3)'S BANS ON SUBSTANTIAL LOBBYING AND POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNING

The Internal Revenue Code prohibits all tax-exempt section
501(c)(3) institutions (including churches and other religious entities)
from "substantial[ly] . . . carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation ...."4 In addition, section 501(c)(3),
through what is often denominated as "the Johnson Amendment," 5
forbids
tax-exempt
organizations,
including
churches,
from
"participat[ing] in, or interven[ing] in, (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office." 6 Unlike the ban on
"substantial" lobbying, section 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on campaigning

2. Abby Phillip, Trump Asks for Prayers for Arnold Schwarzenegger's Ratings at
National Prayer Breakfast, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2017/02/02/trump-asks-for-prayers-for-arnold-schwarzeneggersratings-at-national-prayer-breakfast.
3. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (h)(l) (2012).
4. Id.
5. The Amendment was named for then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, who proposed
the provision in 1954. See 100 CoNG. REC. 9,604 (1954).
6. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3).
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makes no allowance for insubstantial campaign activity by a taxexempt entity. 7
The Code's prohibitions on political lobbying and campaigning have
been controversial, particularly as applied to churches. 8 Liberals claim
that conservative churches flout the statutory bar on political activity to
support Republican candidates. 9 Conservatives retort that liberal
churches, particularly African American churches, campaign on behalf
of Democrats. 10 Objective evidence suggests that both of these criticisms
have some validity. 11 Moreover, some church groups openly defy section
501(c)(3)'s ban on political activity. 12
Revenue Ruling 2007-411 3 is the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS)
current interpretation of the statutory prohibition on political
campaigning by section 501(c)(3) organizations. The IRS understands
this prohibition on political activity as requiring the IRS to intrude
deeply into churches' internal operations to monitor and evaluate the
comments of church personnel. 14 According to that ruling, for example,
a minister, while free to make statements as an individual, cannot
endorse a candidate for public office at "an official church function, [or]

7. Id.
8. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens,
and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1138-39 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Deducting Political Expenditures, 153 TAX
NOTES 84 7, 853 (2016) ("There is a fair chance that most of that political activity is in the
segment of churches that entered politics in a big way in the form of the Moral Majority
beginning in the late 1970s."); The Rise of the Religious Right in the Republican Party,
THEOCRACY WATCH, http://www.theocracywatch.org (last updated Feb. 2011).
10. See, e.g., Many Black Pastors 'Extensions of Democratic Party', ONE NEWS Now
(Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.onenewsnow.com/church/2015/03/09/many-black-pastorsextensions-of-democratic-party.
11. See Many Americans Hear Politics from the Pulpit, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2016),
http://www.pewforum.org/2016/08/08/many-americans-hear-politics-from-the-pulpit.
12. See Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want to Develop Rules Regarding
Charities and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 673-74 (2012) (discussing ''Pulpit
Freedom Sunday"); Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, It Is Time to Enforce the Campaigning
Prohibition. Euen Against Churches, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 145 (2016) (discussing
"Pulpit Freedom Sunday"); Mayer, supra note 8, at 1140 (discussing "Pulpit Freedom
Sunday''); Nathan J. Richman, Grassley Questions Namorato on Sermon Letter, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/personnel-peoplebiographies/grassley-questions-namorato-sermon -letter/2015/08/25/15223691 (discussing
the Alliance Defense Fund's ''Pulpit Initiative''); Erik Stanley, How to Fix the Johnson
Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2017, 7:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-fixthe-johnson-amendment-1486686394 (discussing ''Pulpit Freedom Sunday").
13. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
14. See id. at 1422-23.
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in an official church publication ...." 15 Thus, a minister's statement
supporting a candidate from the pulpit, in a church's newsletter to its
parishioners, or on a church website can potentially cost his church its
tax-exempt status. 16
Moreover, according to the IRS, a prohibited endorsement need not
be explicit. 17 For example, without expressly backing a candidate, a
church (or other nonprofit organization) can lose its tax-exempt status
under section 501(c)(3) by making itself available as a forum to one
candidate but not to another "during the . . . campaign." 18 Since
candidates today campaign nonstop, 19 this standard effectively requires
the IRS to scrutinize churches' year-round activities to ensure that
churches do not implicitly endorse candidates by granting them
selective access to the church as a forum.
These administrative rules carve out a safe harbor for incumbents. 20
Current officeholders can be invited to attend and speak at functions
sponsored by churches and other 501(c)(3) entities as long as no explicit
reference is made to the incumbent's re-election. 21
A skeptical interpretation of this safe harbor is that the IRS thereby
accommodates the senators and representatives who approve its
budget. A less jaundiced explanation is that this safe harbor recognizes
a legitimate need to permit incumbent officeholders to make routine
appearances in their respective constituencies. Either way, challengers
are potentially disadvantaged by this administrative rule since there is
no equivalent safe harbor protecting a church's (or other nonprofit
organization's) tax-exempt status if it invites only a non-incumbent
candidate to speak.
Moreover, according to the IRS in Revenue Ruling 2007-41, the
"issue advocacy" of a tax-exempt group may "function as ... campaign
intervention" 22 and thus cost the group its tax-exempt status. Whether
such issue advocacy is permitted is a fact-based determination with all

15. Id. at 1422 (situation 5); see also id. at 1423 (situation 6) (providing that candidate
endorsement offered at "an official organization meeting . . . constitute[s] political
campaign intervention").
16. See id. at 1426 (situation 21).
17. See id. at 1423 (situation 9).
18. Id.
19. See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN & THOMAS E. MANN, THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND
ITS FuTURE, at vii (2000) (explaining that "[c]andidates for the presidency and Congress
now are in a perpetual campaign mode").
20. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1424 (situations 10-11).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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of the uncertainties that implies. 23 Among the relevant considerations
identified by the IRS is whether the issue being addressed by the
501(c)(3) entity "is a prominent issue in a campaign that distinguishes
the candidates." 24 Under this fact-based standard, a minister's sermon
could jeopardize her church's tax-exempt status if, on the Sunday before
an election, the minister supports or opposes abortion rights, same-sex
marriage, gun control, the death penalty, or the Confederate flag,
should the IRS determine any of these subjects to be "a prominent
issue" in the electoral campaign. 25
Unlike the Code's prohibition on "substantial" lobbying, the Code's
ban on political campaigning by tax-exempt entities is absolute. 26 On
the Sunday before the 1992 presidential election, Branch Ministries
placed an advertisement in The Washington Times and in USA Today,
urging Christians to vote against then-governor Bill Clinton. 27 In
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 28 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit held that these two ads were sufficient to trigger the ban on
campaigning by tax-exempt organizations. 29
Section 4955, enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1987, 30 imposes
an excise tax on the campaign expenditure of any section 501(c)(3)
organization including any church or other religious tax-exempt
entity. 31 This excise tax applies both to the entity 32 and to any manager
of the entity who knowingly agrees to such campaign expenditure
unless the manager did not act "willful[ly]" and had "reasonable
cause." 33 The excise tax established by section 4955 gives the IRS a

23. Id. ("All the facts and circumstances need to be considered to determine if the
advocacy is political campaign intervention.").
24. Id. at 1425 (situation 16).
25. See id.
26. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
27. Id. at 140.
28. 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
29. Id. at 139.
30. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987). The Revenue Act
of 1987 also added to the Code two procedural provisions addressing "flagrant" campaign
participation by section 501(c)(3) organizations. Id. § 10713. Section 6852 authorizes an
immediate assessment of the excise tax imposed by section 4955 if there is "a flagrant
violation of the prohibition against making political expenditures." I.RC. § 6852(a)(l)(B)
(2012). Section 7409 authorizes an injunction against a 501(c)(3) entity to stop it from
continuing to "flagrantly" participate in a political campaign. Id. § 7409(a)(2)(B)(i).
31. Id. § 4955.
32. Id. §§ 4955(a)(l), 4955(b)(l).
33. Id. §§ 4955(a)(2), 4955(b)(2).
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method to enforce the statutory ban on campaign expenditures short of
formally revoking the offending group's tax-exempt status. 34
While section 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on campaign expenditures is
absolute, that section's ban on lobbying only bans "substantial" lobbying
by a tax-exempt entity. 35 This statutory proscription on substantial
lobbying, like the prohibition of all campaigning by tax-exempt
organizations, requires fact-based enforcement determinations by the
IRS and, ultimately, the courts. Under the relevant Treasury
regulations, a tax-exempt organization engages in statutorilyprohibited lobbying if the organization "[c]ontacts, or urges the public to
contact, members of a legislative body for the purpose of proposing,
supporting, or opposing legislation; or [a]dvocates the adoption or
rejection of legislation." 36 Thus, a minister's comments in a sermon
could jeopardize the church's tax-exempt status if those comments are
construed as "[a]dvocat[ing] the adoption or rejection of legislation." 37
Under these rules, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
upheld the revocation of the tax-exempt status of Christian Echoes
National Ministry as the church had "attempt[ed] to influence
legislation through an indirect campaign to mold public opinion." 38
In response to the uncertainty of determining whether lobbying is
"substantial" or not, Congress, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, added
sections 501(h) and 4911 to the Internal Revenue Code. 39 Section
501(h) 40 allows most tax-exempt organizations classified as public
34. Strictly speaking, any participation in a political campaign causes the
participating organization to lose its tax-exempt status under Code section 501(c)(3).
However, the language of section 4955 contrasts with the language of section 4912.
Section 4912 imposes an excise tax on an organization which has lost its tax-exempt
status ''by reason of making lobbying expenditures." I.R.C. § 4912(a) (2012). Section 4955
contains no equivalent language. Id. § 4955(a). The most natural reading of the two
sections side-by-side reveals that section 4912 applies when a previously tax-exempt
entity has lost its tax-exemption but that section 4955 can apply without such a formal
loss being declared by the IRS.
35. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
36: Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)(ii)(a)-(b) (as amended in 2014).
37. Id.
38. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th
Cir. 1972).
39. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
40. I.R.C. § 501(h) (2015). For purposes of sections 501(h) and 4911, ''lobbying
expenditures" are an exempt entity's total outlays attempting to influence legislation
including communications with government officials and efforts to influence public
opinion. I.R.C. §§ 501(h)(2)(A), 4911(c)(l), 4911(d)(l). "Grass roots expenditures" are the
subset of these oi.itlays devoted to influencing public opinion. I.R.C. §§ 501(h)(2)(C),
4911(c)(3). Under section 4911, an exempt organization's "exempt purpose expenditures"
are the organization's total annual outlays for the purposes for which the organization is
tax-exempt exclusive of the organization's fundraising costs. I.R.C. § 4911(e)(l).
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charities 41 to elect a safe harbor calculation to determine if the electing
charity's lobbying is substantial or not.
A public charity that has made the section 501(h) election calculates
its exempt purpose expenditures and then takes a percentage of those
expenditures to determine its nontaxable lobbying amount and its
lobbying ceiling amount for the year. 42 For example, if a school that has
made the 501(h) election makes annual exempt purpose expenditures of
$400,000 on its educational activities, the school's lobbying taxable
amount for the year is 20% of that figure, i.e., $80,000. 43 If the school's
exempt purpose expenditures are instead $600,000, its lobbying taxable
amount is 20% of the first $500,000 plus 15% of the balance for a total
of $115,000. 44
To see the operation of sections 501(h) and 4911, suppose that the
school with a lobbying taxable amount of $80,000 actually spends
$50,000 in that year on lobbying. This is a no-harm-no-foul situation:
Since the school's lobbying outlays are less than its ceiling amount
($120,000), the school's lobbying is insubstantial for purposes of section
501(c)(3) and the school's tax-exempt status. Moreover, no excise tax is
due since the school's lobbying outlays are less than its lobbying
nontaxable amount ($80,000).
Assume instead that the school spends $100,000 this year on
lobbying. In that case, the school's exemption remains secure because
its lobbying outlays are still less than the lobbying ceiling amount of

41. The Internal Code Revenue classifies entities tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3)
as either public charities or private foundations. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Why the BuffettGates Giving Pledge Requires Limitation of the Estate Tax Charitable Deduction, 16 FLA.
TAX REV. 393, 400-04 (2014) (discussing the classification of 501(c)(3) organizations as
either public charities or private foundations).
42. I.R.C. §§ 501(h)(2)(B), 4911(c)(2).
43. See id. § 4911(c)(2).
44. See id. An organization's lobbying ceiling amount is 150% of its lobbying
nontaxable amount. I.R.C. § 501(h)(2)(B). Its grass roots nontaxable amount and its grass
roots ceiling amount are twenty-five percent of the equivalent lobbying figures. I.R.C. §
4911(c)(4). For all organizations electing under section 501(h), the lobbying nontaxable
amount is capped at $1,000,000. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2)(A).
If a public charity makes the section 501(h) election, as long as its ''lobbying
expenditures" are "normally'' less than its ''lobbying ceiling amount" and its "grass roots
expenditures" are "normally" less than its "grass roots ceiling amount," the public charity
remains tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3). I.R.C. § 501(h)(l). If, however, a public
charity that has made the section 501(h) election makes more lobbying expenditures than
its ''lobbying nontaxable amount" or makes more "grass roots expenditures" than its
"grass roots nontaxable amount," section 4911 imposes an excise tax of twenty-five
percent on the excess. I.R.C. §§ 4911(a)-(b).
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$120,000. However, the school now owes tax under section 4911 of
$5,000, i.e., 25% of the excess of $100,000 over $80,000. 45
Suppose finally that this school spends $125,000 on lobbying. In
this case, the school's lobbying, since it exceeds the lobbying ceiling
amount of $120,000, can cause loss of the school's tax-exempt status if
the school "normally" exceeds the lobbying ceiling amount. Even if this
high level of lobbying expenditures is an isolated, rather than a normal,
case, the school owes the 25% excise tax on the amount of its lobbying
outlays ($125,000) over the school's nontaxable lobbying amount
($80,000).
Churches, their auxiliaries, and conventions of churches are not
allowed to make the 501(h) safe harbor election. 46 At first blush,
denying churches the section 501(h) safe harbor option appears hostile
to their interests: Why deny churches an option available to other taxexempt entities? However, the legislative history of the 1976 law
indicates that churches asked to be denied this option. The General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 states that, during the
legislative process, churches had "indicated a concern that if a church
were permitted to elect the new rules [of section 501(h)], then the
Internal Revenue Service might be influenced by this legislation even
though the church in fact did not elect." 47
Suppose, for example, that a church routinely spends $400,000 on
its sacerdotal activities and "normally" spends $125,000 on lobbying. If
section 501(h) applied to the church, the church would lose its taxexempt status because of its lobbying. As described by the General
Explanation, some churches were concerned that the IRS and the
courts, in this example, would automatically assume that the church's
lobbying was "substantial" even if the church had not made the section
501(h) election. 48
To accommodate this concern, churches and church auxiliaries and
conventions cannot make the section 501(h) safe harbor election. 49
Moreover, Code section 501(h)(7) specifies that the standards
established by section 501(h) to identify when lobbying is substantial
have no relevance to the lobbying activities of those eleemosynary

45. See I.RC. § 49ll(c)(4).
46. I.RC. § 501(h)(5) (2012).
47. JOINT COMMI'ITEE ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1976 415 (1976).
48. Id.
49. I.RC. § 501(h)(5).
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entities which cannot or do not elect section 501(h)'s safe harbor for
lobbying outlays. 50
Thus, section 501(h) plays no role in determining whether or not a
church's lobbying is substantial. While churches cannot elect section
501(h)'s safe harbor on lobbying expenses, a non-church religious
organization with sufficient public support to qualify as a public charity
can make this election. 51
If a public charity (but not a church) skips the section 501(h)
election and loses its tax-exempt status because of substantial lobbying,
a five percent excise tax applies to the public charity's lobbying
expenditures. 52 This excise tax applies both to the public charity 53 and
to any manager of the public charity who knowingly agreed to such
lobbying expenditures, unless such manager did not act "willful[ly]" and
had "reasonable cause."5 4
Section 501(c)(3)'s prohibitions on campaigning and substantial
lobbying engender considerable enforcement-related entanglement 55
between church and state. The IRS, to enforce these prohibitions, must
monitor and evaluate church activities and the statements of church
personnel to determine if such activities and statements constitute
explicit or implicit campaigning or amount to "substantial" lobbying.
This enforcement is a deeply entangling enterprise. Insofar as the
IRS is enmeshed with secular nonprofit institutions as the IRS
scrutinizes their activities and communications, this enforcement50. I.RC. § 50l(h)(7); see also DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY
TAXES 79-83 (1977) (discussing church opposition to section 501(h)).
51. I.RC. § 501(h)(4)(D).
52. I.RC. § 4912 (2015).
53. I.RC. § 4912(a)-(b) (2012).
54. I.RC. § 4912(b).
55. I propose to denominate as "enforcement entanglement" the enmeshment of
church and state which results when churches are taxed. I propose the label ''borderline
entanglement" for the church-state tussles which occur when churches and other
sectarian actors are tax-exempt. When churches (and other religious entities and actors)
are tax-exempt, they must claim exemption while tax collectors must police the
boundaries of exemption and sometimes reject those claims. The upshot is church-state
entanglement over the borders of exemption.
Taxing churches and religious institutions leads to church-state enforcement
entanglement while exempting churches and sectarian entities leads to borderline
entanglement over the boundaries of the exemption. When the modern government
confronts the contemporary church, there is no disentangling alternative.
See Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Tax Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the
Establishment Clause? The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion and
the Religious Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the FICA and SelfEmployment Taxes, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1633, 1661-65 (2012), for the distinction between
enforcement entanglement and borderline entanglement, and the inevitability of either
when taxing or exempting religious organizations.
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related entanglement might be considered acceptable: The Free
Exercise clause does not protect secular nonprofit organizations in the
implementation of their respective missions. 56 However, the IRS's
monitoring and evaluation of internal church communications intrudes
deeply into "the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies" protected by
the First Amendment. 57

III. THE CONTROVERSY
No commentator is completely happy with section 501(c)(3)'s
prohibition on political campaigning by tax-exempt entities. Even legal
scholars who are supportive of this prohibition call for technical
modifications to the prohibition or for better enforcement of the
prohibition.
Professor Roger Colinvaux concludes that the ban on campaigning
by tax-exempt entities "serves important purposes" 58 with "no easy
alternative." 59 He identifies five rationales for the prohibition of
political campaigning by tax-exempt entities:
(1) Congress wants charities to focus on core charitable activity;
(2) Congress wants a charitable sector untainted by partisan
flavor; (3) Congress does not want to subsidize political activity
through exemption; (4) Congress wants to protect charities from
political capture; and (5) Congress does not think political
activity is charitable activity. 60
Professor Laura Chisolm would also retain the prohibition on
campaign activity by 501(c)(3) groups. 61 However, she would enable
such groups to form and maintain political action committees (PACs)
under section 527 62 as long as there is "formal and fiscal separation"
between any tax-exempt institution and its respective PAC. 63
Professor Ellen Aprill urges the IRS to develop more detailed
administrative rules to implement section 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on

56. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 667-71 (1970).
57. Id. at 672.
58. Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens United:
A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 755 (2012).
59. Id. at 756.
60. Id. at 711.
61. Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 362 (1990).
62. See l.R.C. § 527 (2015).
63. Chisolm, supra note 61, at 363.
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political campaigning by tax-exempt institutions. 64 Attorney Kelley S.
Shoop argues that the Code's ban on tax-exempt entities' political
campaigning "should [be] more actively enforce[d]." 65
Dean Donald B. Tobin supports the ban on campaigning by taxexempt entities, but also calls for more effective enforcement. 66 The ban,
he argues, is good for both churches and "society as a whole." 67 Viewing
the income tax treatment of section 501(c)(3) groups as a subsidy, Dean
Tobin contends that, "[s]ubsidizing the entry of churches into politics
artificially increases the power of religious institutions in society and
poses serious problems for our current system of governance. This may
allow churches, or their followers, to be overrepresented in political
debates and political life." 6 8
Dean Tobin also views the ban on campaign activity as good for
churches. 69 If churches can campaign, they will be "co-opted" and
"intimidate[ed] by powerful politicians or political parties." 70 Moreover,
if churches can campaign, politicians will prefer some churches (those
supporting them) over others (those opposing them), while churches
themselves will become internally divided over which candidates to
support. 71 To strengthen enforcement, Dean Tobin proposes that the
501(c)(3) prohibition on political campaigning by tax-exempt entities be
administered by "an independent commission." 72
Professor Samuel Brunson advances three reasons for stricter
enforcement of the 501(c)(3) ban on churches' political campaigning 73 :
"First, the IRS should enforce the law as written." 74 Second, enhanced
enforcement of section 501(c)(3) would make Congress accountable for
"the law it has written." 75 Finally, such enforcement would give affected
64. Aprill, supra note 12, at 683.
65. Kelly S. Shoop, Note, If You Are a Good Christian You Have No Business Voting
for This Candidate: Church Sponsored Political Activity in Federal Elections, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1927, 1948 (2005).
66. Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous
for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1342 (2007).
67. Id. at 1320.
68. Id. at 1326.
69. Id. at 1322.
70. Id. at 1322-23.
71. Id. at 1323-24.
72. Id. at 1359--61. Some of the commissioners would be selected by the President;
others would be picked by the leader of the opposition party in the Senate; yet other
commissioners would be randomly chosen "IRS career employees in the Exempt
Organizations Division of the IRS who had ten or more years of experience at the IRS." Id.
at 1361.
73. Brunson, supra note 12, at 171.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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churches standing "to place the constitutionality of the prohibition in
front of the courts." 76
Many legal scholars are troubled that the Code's bar on political
campaigning intrudes on church autonomy. 77 As previously discussed,
these scholars propose fundamental alternatives to current law to
reduce that intrusion 78 and emphasize the rights of ministers and
church members to communicate freely among themselves, without
scrutiny by the tax collector. 79 Central to this critique of the Code's ban
on churches' campaigning is the celebration of the historic role of
churches as participants in important political movements in American
life. 80 The alternatives to the Johnson Amendment, advanced by these
scholars, touch upon a variety of important issues, including the tradeoff between enforcement entanglement and borderline entanglement,
and whether relief should be provided narrowly to churches, more
broadly to religious organizations, or most broadly to all eleemosynary
institutions. 81 These proposals demonstrate that in this area there are
no ideal solutions, only imperfect trade-offs among competing and
legitimate values.
Professor Buckles, for example, would repeal section 501(c)(3)'s
blanket ban on participation in political campaigns, 82 and replace it
with an excise tax in the Internal Revenue Code on the "political
campaign expenditures" of tax-exempt organizations that are not
"independently controlled." 83 While his proposed definition of "political
campaign expenditure" would largely track current law, Professor
Buckles would provide a safe harbor for any "expenditures for any oral,
in-person communication" made primarily between an exempt
"charitable organization's agents and its 'members."' 84 Thus, a
minister's, rabbi's, or imam's verbally-delivered sermon would be
immunized from scrutiny of its content but a written statement in a
church newsletter would not be protected by this safe harbor for
campaign activity. 85 For this purpose, the determination of a 501(c)(3)
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political
Campaign Activity by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1074
(2007); discussion infra pp. 1541-51.
78. See discussion infra pp. 1541-51.
79. See discussion infra pp. 1541-51.
80. See discussion infra pp. 1541-51.
81. See discussion infra pp. 1541-51.
82. Buckles, supra note 77, at 1100.
83. Id. at 1101.
84. Id. at 1102.
85. See id. An interesting issue under this proposal is whether a sermon retains its
status as protected "oral" communication with members, if the sermon is videotaped and
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entity's independence would be based on the rules currently applicable
to private foundations. 86
Professor Buckles' proposal to amend the Internal Revenue Code
eliminates one of the most entangling enforcement inquiries under
current law: the IRS's monitoring and evaluation of pulpit
communications to determine if such communications constitute
political campaigning. 87 His proposal would also minimize borderline
entanglement because his proposed safe harbor for independentlyauthorized campaign expenditures would apply to all independently
governed 501(c)(3) organizations. 88 Thus, to administer his proposal,
there would, in specific cases, be no need to determine if a particular
independently-governed organization is a "church," because this
organization might qualify as "religious" or as charitable or educational.
On the other hand, Professor Buckles' proposal would leave many
houses of worship subject to his recommended excise tax on political
campaigning. Numerous synagogues, for example, would not satisfy
Professor Buckles' criteria for independent governance, because a
majority of a synagogue's board members are often officers of-and
substantial contributors 89 to-the synagogue. 90 Similarly, a prototypical
family-based entrepreneurial church would not qualify as
independently-governed under this proposal, because the church
founder, and the founder's family, often dominate the church's
governing board. 91
placed on the church's website. A similarly interesting issue is whether, in the case of a
megachurch with multiple locations, a sermon delivered at the main church location is
still "oral" communication when it is simultaneously broadcast to the church's satellite
locations.
86. See id. at 1101.
Under Professor Buckles' proposal, to qualify as an
independently-governed entity, a majority of the board overseeing the entity must not be
officers, employees, "substantial contributors," or family members of such an officer,
employee or contributor. Id. at 1100. If an entity satisfies this initial test of independent
governance, campaign expenditures by the entity must, as a procedural matter, only be
authorized by its independent directors, without the participation of the minority of
dependent directors. Id. at 1102.
87. See id. at 1100.
88. See id.
89. For this purpose, Professor Buckles would incorporate the definition of a
"substantial contributor" used in section 507(d)(2) in the context of private foundations.
See id. at 1105. In particular, Internal Revenue Code section 507(d)(2) defines an
individual as a "substantial contributor" if the individual and her spouse cumulatively
contribute more than $5000 in any year and if such cumulative contributions constitute
more than 2% of total contributions received by the donee institution. I.RC. §
507(d)(2)(A).
90. See Buckles, supra note 77, at 1100.
91. For example, Saddleback, a church with physical locations both nationally and
internationally, and online churches, is run: by husband and wife Rick and Kay Warren.
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Under Professor Buckles' proposal, political campaign expenditures
by these non-independently-governed entities would trigger a punitive
tax, based on the highest federal income tax rate, increased by twenty
percent. 92 Under current tax rates, 93 this penalty would be 57% of the
political campaign expenditure of any 501(c)(3) group that is not
independently-governed, or the political campaign expenditure of an
independently-governed 501(c)(3) entity, if the expenditure was
influenced by inside directors. 94
On the other hand, there would be no adverse tax consequences if a
majority of the independent directors of an independently-governed taxexempt entity approved a political campaign expenditure, and there
would be no penalty for any in-person communication among church
members. 95
Consider in this context an iconic moment in American history:
Martin Luther King, Sr.'s switch of his support in the 1960 presidential
election from Richard M. Nixon to John F. Kennedy. 96 Rev. King
announced that he now supported Kennedy (despite Kennedy's
Catholicism), because of Kennedy's telephone call to Mrs. Coretta Scott
King. 97 In that call, Kennedy had expressed concern for the safety of
Martin Luther King, Jr., who had recently been arrested by the Atlanta
police and was being held in a Georgia state prison. 98
Under Revenue Ruling 2007-41, this endorsement, had it been
made from the pulpit, could have cost Rev. King's church its tax-exempt
status under section 501(c)(3). 99 However, as an oral communication
with the church's members, a statement from the pulpit would have
been protected by the safe harbor Professor Buckles proposes for
internal church communications. 100 On the other hand, if Rev. King, Sr.
had allowed this statement to be videotaped and replayed on Atlanta's
television stations, the relevant issue under the Buckles proposal would
have been whether there was an "expenditure" (such as Rev. King's
See SADDLEBACK CHURCH, http://www.saddleback.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2018);
Biography, KAY WARREN, http://kaywarren.com/biography (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
92. Buckles, supra note 77, at 1102.
93. The current highest income tax bracket for individuals is 37%. I.RC. § 1, amended
by Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.
94. See I.RC.§ l; Buckles, supra note 77, at 1102.
95. Buckles, supra note 77, at 1102.
96. THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1960 323 (1961).
97. Id. at 322-23.
98. Id. at 321-22.
99. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421 (noting in example situation five, that if a
minister endorses a political candidate at an official church function, the endorsement
would constitute prohibited campaign intervention).
100. Buckles, supra note 77, at 1102.
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salary) which had been authorized by independent directors who
compromised a majority of the church's board. 101
In contrast to Professor Buckles' proposal, I would not focus on the
governance of the church, but would instead emphasize the dichotomy
between internal church communications and resource-diverting
activity.
I would also create special rules only for churches,
understanding that a narrowly-drawn exemption would entail
borderline entanglement in determining whether entities are or are not
churches eligible for this proposed safe harbor. That is a cost I would
accept, to protect the autonomy of internal church communications,
while also preventing the tax-exempt sector from becoming a conduit for
tax-deductible campaign contributions.
Unlike Professor Buckles, Attorney David S. Miller would retain the
Code's general ban on political campaigning by all section 501(c)(3)
organizations. 102 However, Miller would create a statutory safe harbor
available to all such organizations. 103 Miller's proposed safe harbor
would be similar to Code section 501(h) 104 but, unlike section 501(h),
would not be elective. 105 Under Miller's proposal to amend the Code,
campaigning by an organization with a single employee or a single
independent contractor would be deemed de minimis if that employee or
contractor spends less than fifteen percent of her time campaigning. 106
For a 501(c)(3) organization with two or more employees or independent
contractors, the statutory safe harbor would apply, so long as less than
ten percent of their collective time was devoted to political
campaigning. 107 A second test to qualify for this safe harbor would
require the tax-exempt entity to spend no more than the lesser of
$5000, or 10% of its non-salary budget on political campaigning. 108
Thus, an occasional sermon addressing political campaign issues or
an isolated candidate endorsement like Rev. King's would be protected
by Miller's proposed safe harbor because relatively little of the
minister's time would be involved in these isolated statements. 109
Similarly, a newspaper ad, like the pre-election advertisement paid for
by Branch Ministries, would pass muster if the cost were $5,000 or less

Id.
David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their
Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 451, 461-62 (2014).
103. Id. at 491-92.
104. I.R.C. § 501(h) (2012).
105. Miller, supra note 102, at 491-92.
106. Id. at 506.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
101.

102.
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and that advertisement represented all of the church's non-salary
campaign expenditures for the year. 110
If a tax-exempt organization's campaign outlays exceeded these safe
harbor limits, Miller would apply an excise tax to these expenditures. m
In addition, the IRS could seek the revocation of tax-exempt status for
political campaigning. 112 However, Miller believes that, under his
approach, this power of revocation "would be applied sparingly." 113
In contrast to the Buckles and Miller proposals to amend the
Internal Revenue Code to provide political campaign safe harbors to all
section 501(c)(3) entities, Professor Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer concludes that
some "[h]ouses of worship ; .. have a strong argument that [the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)] requires an exception to the
[campaigning] prohibition in the unique context of in-person sermons
during regular worship services." 114 Professor Mayer also suggests that
RFRA and the First Amendment's Free Exercise clause might protect
"the internal religious communications of houses of worship" from
section 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on campaigning. 115
Professor Mayer's perspective, protecting sermons and possibly
other internal church communication, requires us to revisit the issue
which troubled the Supreme Court plurality in Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 116 namely, the borderline entanglement flowing from a
narrowly drawn exemption for religious entities. 117 In this case, the
exception Professor Mayer would craft is narrow since it would apply
only to churches, not to non-church religious organizations or to secular
entities. 118 My proposal is similarly narrow.
Attorney Deirdre Dessingue takes a particularly nuanced view of
the relationship between religion and politics; she argues the church
loses its "distinctive prophetic voice" when it intervenes in partisan
politics. 119 On the other hand, she writes, "[c]hurches have a played a
pivotal role in every important political struggle since (and including)
national independence: the abolition of slavery, gambling, child labor,

110. See id.
111. Id. at 507.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Mayer, supra note 8, at 1142.
115. Id. at 1216.
116. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
117. Mayer, supra note 8, at 1194-95.
118. See id. at 1195-96.
119. Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a Rationale: What the Tax Code
Prohibits; Why; To What End?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 903, 925 (2001).
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prostitution, temperance, the death penalty, the war in Vietnam,
abortion, and civil rights." 120
From this premise, she calls for a fundamental contraction of the
Code's prohibition on churches' political campaigning: "The prohibition
should be limited to explicit endorsements of or opposition to political
candidates and other clear and unambiguous support, financial or
otherwise. Discussion of issues should never constitute prohibited
political activity."121
Professor Allan J. Samansky's views are similar. He calls for "a
more liberal interpretation of the ban against campaigning by
churches." 122 "[C]hurches and religious leaders should have virtually
complete freedom to communicate with their congregations." 123
However, Professor Samansky would not permit "official endorsement
by a church." 124 He would also keep current law for other tax-exempt
organizations arguing "that there are convincing arguments for treating
churches differently from other section 5O1(c)(3) organizations when
interpreting and applying the prohibition against intervening in
campaigns." 125
Professors Nina J. Crimm and Laurence H. Winer urge Congress to
amend section 5O1(c)(3) to permit all tax-exempt organizations, secular
and religious, to engage in both internal and external political
campaign speech. 126 However, donors to any organization engaging in
such speech would lose the charitable deduction under Internal
Revenue Code section 1 70 for their contributions to that organization. 127
From the foregoing, it is fair to say that no commentator is satisfied
with the status quo. Those favoring the current statute call for better
enforcement and more objective interpretive guidelines of section
5O1(c)(3)'s ban on political campaigning. Critics view the Code's current
prohibitions on campaigning and substantial lobbying by tax-exempt
entities as intruding unacceptably into internal church autonomy.
The proponents of section 5O1(c)(3) in its current form score their
heaviest points when they raise the prospect of tax-deductible resource

120. Id. at 923.
121. Id. at 928.
122. Allan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences When Churches Participate in Political
Campaigns, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 145, 151 (2007).
123. Id. at 165.
124. Id. at 178.
125. Id. at 152.
126. NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT:
PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 327 (2011).
127. Id.
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diversion. 128 Without some restraints, nonprofits could easily become
conduits for funneling income tax deductible resources into political
campaigning and lobbying. 129 This is an outcome no one should favor.
As I stated in my OUP Blog on this issue:
Critics of the status quo occupy their strongest ground when
they
seek
to
protect
internal
discussions
within
congregations. . . . current law entangles church and state
[insofar] as the Code now requires the IRS to monitor and
evaluate discussions within congregations to ascertain if those
discussions constitute as. campaigning.... Had the [501(c)(3)]
ban[s] on campaigning [and substantial lobbying] been
aggressively enforced in the past, American life would have
been diminished. Such causes as abolitionism and civil rights
were deeply anchored in America's churches. 130
Taking this debate into the 115th Congress, Representative Walter
B. Jones, Jr. of North Carolina has introduced legislation to repeal the
Johnson Amendment in its entirety. 131 Senator James Lankford of
Oklahoma and Representative Steve Scalise of Louisiana have proposed
to amend section 501(c)(3) to permit any tax-exempt organization to
make any kind of statement "in the ordinary course of the
organization's regular and customary activities in carrying out its
exempt purpose" as long as such statement does not entail the
organization "incurring . . . more than de minimis incremental
expenses." 132 President Trump, reiterating the position he took during

128. See Chisolm, supra note 61, at 325-27; Tobin, supra note 66, at 1317-18; Shoop,
supra note 65, at 1930-31.
129. Linda Czipo, Don't Weaken the Existing Ban on Electioneering by 501(c)(3)
Organizations, CTR. FOR NON-PROFITS (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.njnonprofits.org/blog/
2017/02/07/dont-weaken-the-existing-ban-on-electioneering-by-501c3-organizations.
130. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Right Way To Amend the Johnson Amendment, OXFORD
U. PRESS: BLOG (Mar. 6, 2017), https://blog.oup.com/2017/03/amend-johnson-amendmentchurches-communication/.
131. H.R. 172, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
132. S. 264, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017); H.R. 781, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017); Erik
Stanley, How to Fix the Johnson Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2017, 7:26 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-fix-the-johnson-amendment-1486686394 (supporting the
Lankford-Scalise legislation).

2017]

CHURCHES' LOBBYING AND CAMPAIGNING

1545

the presidential campaign, 133 has pledged to "get rid of and totally
destroy the Johnson Amendment."134
The Jones proposal would leave intact section 501(c)(3)'s prohibition
on substantial lobbying activities by tax-exempt organizations. 135 In
contrast, the safe harbor created by the Lankford-Scalise legislation
would also immunize a tax-exempt organization's statements from the
section 501(c)(3) ban on substantial lobbying. 136
Most recently, proposed Section 5201 of House Bill 1, the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act, would have amended Section 501(c)(3) to create a safe
harbor permitting political statements in "any homily, sermon,
teaching, dialectic, or other presentation made during religious services
or gatherings." 137 To qualify for this safe harbor under the proposal, a
statement would have to be made "in the ordinary course of the
[church's] regular and customary activities" in furtherance of the
church's religious purpose and could result in no "more than de minimis
incremental expenses" by the church. 138 However, Section 5201 did not
appear in the final version of the enacted bill. 139
IV. A PROPOSAL TO PROTECT INTERNAL CHURCH CO:MMUNICATIONS

I would resolve this debate by amending the Internal Revenue Code
to create a statutory safe harbor protecting internal church
communications from both the ban on political campaigning and the
ban on substantial lobbying. No inference or presumption should arise
as to activity or expression outside the proposed statutory safe harbor.
This proposal would shelter the internal expressive autonomy of
churches while continuing to deter the use of churches and other taxexempt organizations to divert tax-deductible resources into political
activity. This statutory safe harbor would reduce the possibilities for
church-state enforcement entanglement since the IRS would no longer
be required to monitor and evaluate internal church communications
for their content. This safe harbor would better balance churches'

133. David Sherfinski, Donald Trump's Push to Repeal Johnson Amendment Buoys
Religious
Freedom
Advocates,
WASH.
TIMES
(Aug.
14,
2016),
http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/14/donald-trum ps-push -to-repeal-johnson ·
amendment-buo/.
134. Phillip, supra note 2.
135. See H.R. 172, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
Ia6. See S. 264, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017); H.R. 781, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
137. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 5201(a) (as introduced in House,
Nov. 2, 2017).
138. Id.
139. See Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.
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legitimate First Amendment concerns about their internal
communications with the need to prevent the diversion of taxdeductible resources to political campaigns.
Contrary to the recommendations of some commentators, 140 I would
not treat "official" or "explicit" endorsements differently from other
internal church discussions. A ban on express endorsements would
reqmre the IRS to continue to scrutinize in-house church
communications. My proposal instead reduces the church-state
enforcement entanglement that arises when the tax collector must
monitor in-house church discussions. Such monitoring would continue if
"official" and "explicit" endorsements remain off-limits to tax-exempt
churches.
Little of substance would be gained by outlawing "official" or
"explicit" endorsements since skilled speakers can make their meanings
clear without using those labels. A rhetorician as adroit as Rev. King,
Sr. could have effectively communicated his support for Kennedy's
candidacy while eschewing terms like "official" and avoiding an express
endorsement. To reduce church-state enforcement entanglement, the
safe harbor protecting in-house church communication should create a
true safe harbor, immunizing from IRS scrutiny all internal church
discussions including any "official" or "explicit" endorsements of
particular candidacies or causes.
My proposal also reflects the conclusion that, in entanglement
terms, it is artificial to treat separately the section 501(c)(3) ban on
campaigning and that section's ban on substantial lobbying. Both
prohibitions, in their current forms, raise the same question about the
autonomy of church communications: Should the IRS be obligated to
police discussions within religious congregations to enforce the
limitations of section 501(c)(3)? When a minister delivers a pro-life or
pro-choice sermon, that sermon can, depending on the circumstances, be
characterized under current law as a lobbying effort to mobilize public
opinion or as political campaigning to support or oppose particular
candidates. Either way, it is, in First Amendment terms, deeply
entangling for the tax collector to be monitoring and evaluating this
sermon.
To reduce enforcement entanglement between the IRS and
churches, all pulpit communications (even "official" and "explicit"
statements and endorsements) should be excluded from both the ban on
political campaigning and the ban on lobbying. Commentators like
Professor Colinvaux and Attorney Dessingue correctly observe that

140.

Dessingue, supra note 119, at 928; Samansky, supra note 122, at 178.
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churches (including synagogues, temples, mosques and other such
religious institutions) forfeit their distinctive voices when they become
overtly partisan. 141 But these congregations, not Congress, are
responsible for protecting their respective voices. The revised statute
should discourage the diversion of tax-exempt resources into
campaigning and lobbying, while safeguarding internal church
discussions from church-state entanglement. Churches must
themselves maintain their unique voices transcending partisanship.
My proposal raises an important issue at the borderline of the
suggested exemption for in-house church communications: What is the
pulpit in the digital age? This inquiry in turn raises two sub-questions:
What is a church? What, in a world of electronic media, are internal,
pulpit-like communications?
Many provisions of the Internal Revenue Code already pose the
entangling borderline question whether particular institutions are
churches or not. For example, the Code places churches into the public
charity category rather than classifying them as private foundations. 142
In procedural terms, the Code excuses "churches, their integrated
auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches" from filing
annual returns 143 and from obtaining IRS confirmation of their taxexempt status. 144 Similarly, the Code extends special audit protections
to "any organization claiming to be a church" 145 and to "any convention
or association of churches." 146 Church retirement plans receive more
lenient treatment under the Code than do the retirement arrangements
of non-church employers. 147 My proposal for a safe harbor for in-house
church communications would create another potentially contentious
borderline between churches, entitled to the protection of such safe
harbor for their in-house messaging, and non-churches, not entitled to
such protection from the section 501(c)(3) bans on campaigning and
substantial lobbying.
In this area, there are no ideal solutions, just imperfect trade-offs.
Through a safe harbor for in-house church communications, I propose to
reduce the enforcement entanglement inherent in the IRS's policing of

141. Colinvaux, supra note 58, at 723-25; Dessingue, supra note 119, at 922-25, 922
n.80.
142. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(l)(A)(i) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 509(a)(l) (2006).
143. 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (2012).
144. 26 U.S.C. § 508(c)(l) (2006).
145. 26 U.S.C. § 7611(h)(l)(A) (1994).
146. Id. § 7611(h)(l)(B).
147. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(9)(C)(iv), 414(e) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2002); Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 501(b)(l), 90 Stat. 1558; see also Advocate
Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).

1548

RUTGERS UNNERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1527

internal church discussions. That safe harbor would protect churches'
in-house conversations from both the section 501(c)(3) prohibition on
campaigning and that section's prohibition of substantial lobbying. The
resulting reduction of enforcement entanglement would come at a cost,
namely, borderline entanglement as the IRS would monitor the
boundaries of a safe harbor limited to internal church discussions to
determine which organizations are (and are not) churches entitled to
the protection of their internal messaging from IRS review.
Borderline entanglement could be mitigated by expanding the
proposed safe harbor for in-house communications to cover the internal
discussions of all religious organizations or, even more broadly, to cover
in-house communications among all 501(c)(3) entities. However, I would
not enlarge the proposed safe harbor to reach beyond internal church
discussions. Supporters of current law correctly cite the danger that
501(c)(3) groups can be used to divert tax-deductible donations into
campaigning and lobbying.1 48 Responding to this concern, my proposed
statutory safe harbor should be limited to the internal communications
of churches. This would leave the current statutory bans intact for all
501(c)(3) groups other than churches and would continue to apply those
bans to churches outside the context of churches' internal
communications.
In particular cases, it would be a challenge under my proposal to
separate internal church communications protected by the suggested
statutory safe harbor from other church activity. In today's world of the
Internet and electronic media, the church's pulpit is not as clearly
demarcated as it was in an earlier age. Hence, the line between internal
communications and external outreach is not as clear today as it once
was.
For example, a preacher in a megachurch may simultaneously
broadcast her sermon to different locations at which the church
conducts services. Those broadcasts will often be available to the world
at large. Similarly, a minister may place her sermon on the church's
website for the benefit of congregants who did not attend the service at
which the sermon was delivered. While steps can be taken to limit the
access of outsiders to these electronically-transmitted communications,
those limits will often be permeable.
The difficulties of distinguishing internal from external
communications in the modern age will sometimes be even greater than
these examples suggest. If a celebrity preacher, like Rev. Billy Graham
or Rev. Rick Warren, makes a politically salient announcement from

148.

See Czipo, supra note 129.
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the pulpit, that announcement will become known to the world at large
moments later. 149 Through social media and television, a celebrity
preacher like Rev. Joel Osteen is regularly heard and read by millions
each week. 150
Under my proposed safe harbor for in-house church
communications, Branch Ministries v. Rossotti 151 would remain good
law. Consequently, if a preacher's church paid for a newspaper
advertisement or hired a public relations firm to disseminate his
announcement beyond the membership of the church, that could
constitute campaigning or lobbying and thus potentially trigger the
prohibitions of section 501(c)(3). The facts of Branch Ministries would
cross the line from protected internal church communications to the
diversion of tax-deductible resources to lobbying and campaigning. 152
Hence, the safe harbor would not apply in that kind of situation since
the church was reaching beyond its membership.
This approach would require difficult line-drawing problems. But
what important legal principle does not, including the Johnson
Amendment in its current form? On balance, the best, albeit imperfect,
trade-off is to protect internal church communications while otherwise
leaving in place the Internal Revenue Code's current prohibitions on
tax-exempt organizations' political campaign activity and substantial
lobbying.
My proposal differs from the Jones bill 153 in two respects. The Jones
legislation would apply to all activities of all 501(c)(3) entities. 154 My
proposal is narrower and would only immunize from scrutiny churches'
internal communications. 155 Moreover, the Jones proposal would leave
intact the ban on "substantial lobbying'' for all exempt organizations,
including churches. 156 My proposal in this respect is broader and would
carve a safe harbor from section 501(c)(3)'s lobbying ban for internal
church communications.

149. See, e.g., Michael W. Chapman, Rev. Billy Graham: 'America is Just as Wicked as
Sodom and Gomorrah Ever Were', CNS NEWS: BLOG (Oct. 16, 2014, 4:56 AM), http://
www.cnsnews.com/mrctv-blog/michael-w-chapman/rev-billy-graham-america-just-wickedsodom-and-gomorrah-ever-were.
150. The Evolution of Joel Osteen, Pastor of the Biggest Church in America, ONLINE
CHRISTIAN COLLEGES (2017), http://www.onlinechristiancolleges.com/joel-osteen/ (stating
Osteen has seven million weekly viewers of his TV ministry).
151. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
152. Id. at 140.
153. H.R. 172, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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The Lankford-Scalise legislation 157 comes closer to my proposal but
is still different in important respects. That legislation would protect
all section 501(c)(3) organizations. 158 I suggest that protection just be
extended to churches. Since the problem is untoward government
intrusion into churches' internal communications, the solution is the
protection of such church communication.
Moreover, the Lankford-Scalise bill would permit any kind of
statement "in the ordinary course of the organization's regular and
customary activities in carrying out its exempt purpose." 159 In contrast,
I propose more targeted protection for churches' internal
communications. Under the Lankford-Scalise bill, a non-church
religious organization could construe its exempt purpose as including
communication aimed at the general public. 160 This is too broad a
standard and could permit the diversion of tax-deductible contributions
to political campaigning. My proposal, in contrast, would protect church
autonomy by creating a safe harbor limited to churches' internal
communications. While succoring the First Amendment rights of
churches (and similar congregations such as synagogues, temples and
mosques), my approach would keep a stronger barrier against the
potential use of tax-deductible donations for political campaigning.
Since the problem is untoward government intrusion into churches'
internal communications, the solution should be targeted to the
protection of such church communications.
Of the recent legislative proposals, Section 5201 of House Bill 1
came closest to the position I advance. Section 5201 would have
retained Section 501(c)(3)'s general ban on political campaigning by
churches and other exempt institutions. 161 However, Section 5201, if
added to Section 501(c)(3), would have immunized internal church
communications from this ban. 162
Section 5201 fell short in two respects. First, the safe harbor that
this legislation would have created in Section 501(c)(3) would not have
protected internal church communications from the Code's prohibition
on lobbying. 163 Comments made during a "homily, sermon, teaching,
dialectic or other presentation" could still be classified as lobbying. 164 If
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deemed substantial, such lobbying could cause a church to lose its taxexempt status. 165 Second, Section 5201, if enacted into law, would have
required the IRS to determine if a particular statement was made "in
the ordinary course of the [church's] regular and customary activities"
furthering the church's religious purposes. 166 This statutory language
would entangle church and state as it would require the IRS to monitor
churches to determine their "regular and customary activities" and to
assess which such activities further the churches' religious purposes. 167
Future legislation could improve upon the proposed Section 5201 by
correcting these two deficiencies. Legislation should extend Section
5201's safe harbor for internal church communications to protect such
communications from Section 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on lobbying. 168
Legislation should also upgrade Section 5201 by deleting from it the
entangling test whether particular statements are made "in the
ordinary course of the [church's] regular and customary activities" in
furtherance of the church's religious purposes. 169 Legislation that
amends and builds from Section 5201 would require that churches not
incur "more than de minimis incremental expenses" in the context of
political statements. 170 This requirement would properly deter the use
of churches as conduits for tax-deductible campaign contributions.
Even without these two changes, Section 5201 would have improved
present law. Added to the Code, Section 5201 would have protected
some internal church communications from characterization as political
campaigning while leaving intact the prohibition against churches and
other exempt institutions being used for such campaigning. 171 With
these two changes, Section 5201 would have implemented the optimal
balance, protecting internal church communications from church-state
entanglement while preventing churches from funneling tax-deductible
resources to political campaigns.172
V. CONCLUSION

Rather than the blanket repeal of the Johnson Amendment
proposed by President Trump, I suggest a statutory safe harbor for the
internal communications of churches. This limited safe harbor would
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protect in-house church discussions from both section 501(c)(3)'s ban on
substantial lobbying, and from that section's prohibition on political
campaigning. Under this proposed amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code, churches would, along with other religious and secular taxexempt institutions, otherwise remain subject to the Code's bars on
campaigning and lobbying. While entanglement considerations counsel
greater protection than current law provides for speech within
churches, these statutory bars properly deter the diversion of income
tax-deductible resources to campaigning and lobbying. My more
targeted reform of the Johnson .Amendment, limited to churches'
internal communications, is a better balance which addresses the
legitimate concerns of churches about their First Amendment rights
while preventing the tax-exempt sector from becoming a conduit for taxdeductible campaign contributions.

